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NOTE AND COMMENT
INDuciNG BREAcH or AGRamNT BY EmPLOYEES NOT TO JOIN A LABOR
'UNION, N ORD3a TO CoMnM UNIONIZATION Olt PLAINTIvr'S BusmNess.-In
Hitchnan Coal & Coke Compazy v. John Mitchell, et al., (Dec. 10, 1917), 38
Sup. Ct. 6s, the novel question was presented to the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States, as to whether or not members of a labor Union could be enjoined
from conspiring to persuade, and persuading, without violence or show of
violence, plaintiff's employees, not members of the Union,-and who were
working for plaintiff not for a specified time, but under an agreement not to
continue in plaintiff's employment if they joined the Union, this agreement
being fully known to defendants,-secretly to agree to join the Union and
continue working for plaintiff until enough had agreed to join, so that a strike
could be called, and plaintiff be thereby forced to unionize its business of
mining coal.
The majority of the court held that a permanent injunction should issue,
Mr. justice PITNEY, delivering the opinion, Mr. Justice BRAmis, delivering
a dissenting opinion, in which Mr. Justice HoLmts, and Mr. Justice CLARIC,
concurred.
NOTE AND COMMENT
In i9o7, plaintiff was the owner of 5o0o acres of coal land in West Vir-
ginia, and employed 2oo or 3oo men in mining about 30o,00o tons of coal
annually. At that time all the mines in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, were
operated as 'union-closed-shop' mines, i. e, no one could hold a job about
them without being a member of the United Mine Workers of America. All
the mines in West Virginia, except a very few, were 'non-union-open-shop'
mines, while those in Pennsylvania were partly 'open,' and partly 'closed'
mines.
Plaintiff had opened their West Virginia mines in i9o2, and operated them
as "non-union," until April i9o3, when, "under threats from the Union
officials," that another mine owned by plaintiff in Ohio, already unionized,
would be closed -down by a strike "if the men at the West Virginia mine
were not allowed to organize," they consented to the unionization of the latter.
For the next three years strikes followed because of difficulties with the
plaintiffs as to scales of wages, and also between the Union and plaintiff's
competitors, for which plaintiff was in no way responsible. The result was
that the mining business in West Virginia was greatly disorganized during
this period, to the loss both of the plaintiff, and the workmen, and plaintiff's
mines stood idle from April to June, x9o6.
In June, i9o6, a self-appointed committee of the former employees of
plaintiff, came to plaintiff to inquire upon what terms they could return to
work, and were informed they could come back but not as members of the
United Mine Workers of America; that plaintiff would not recognize that
Union; that contracts would be made with individual workmen only; that
the mines would be run non-union; that if any one wanted to join the union
he could do so, but if he did, he could not remain in the employ of the
company; that if he worked for plaintiff, he would have to work as a non-
union man. Each employee was told this, and agreed to it before he was em-
ployed. The employment was not for a specified time. Operations were
resumed, upon these conditions, June 12, x9o6, and carried on with entire
satisfaction to all parties for more than a year.
About July I, i9o7, three of the defendants, G., Z., and W., called on
plaintiff's general manager to submit "a proposition for the unionization of
the mine;" the manager refused to consider this, but at the request of these
defendants laid it before plaintiff's board of directors, who rejected it. At
some of the interviews plaintiff's manager told these defendants the terms
upon which the men were employed.
In September, i9o7, another defendant, H., was sent by the Union to or-
ganize all the mines in the district where plaintiff's mines were located;
H. had distinct and timely notice that the contract between plaintiff and its
employees expressly provided that the latter, if they joined the Union, should
not remain in plaintiff's employment.
H. remained more than a month in the vicinity, interviewing as many of
plaintiff's employees as possible, resorting to deception and abuse, holding
public meetings, at which he abused plaintiff's superintendent, and intimat-
ing that wages paid by plaintiff would probably be reduced unless the mines
were unionized. He kept secret the names of those who had agreed to join
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the Union, but said that "after he got the majority he would organize the
place," and that "they had sixty men signed up," about enough to "crack off,"
and "were going to shut down the mine as soon as he got a few more."
At another non-union mine in the same vicinity, not belonging to plain-
tiff, the same defendant, H., had been laboring with the employees, and
about the middle of October, had succeeded in shutting it down.
October 24, i9o7, plaintiff brought its bill for an injunction against the
defendants alleging that they have unlawfully formed themselves into a con-
spiracy the purpose of which is "to cause your orator's mine to be shut down,
its plant to remain idle, its contracts to be broken and unfulfilled, until your
orator shall submit to the demand of the Union" to unionize its plant, and
thereafter to employ only Union men.
A final decree granting a perpetual injunction was made in 1913 by the
District Court, (2o2 Fed. 512); this was reversed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1914 (214 Fed. 685); afterwards an appeal was allowed, but
dismissed by the Supreme Court, although a writ of certiorari was granted
(241 U. S. 644). Upon final hearing the decree of the Circuit Court of
Appeals was reversed, and the decree of the District Court modified, and
affirmed as modified.
Mr. Justice PRrNiY'S opinion is based upon propositions which may be
summarized:
As to plaintiff's rights: (x) Plaintiff is as free to make non-membership
in a union a condition, of employment, as the working man is free to join the
union. This is part of the constitutional right of personal liberty and private
property, not to be taken away even by legislation, except under the para-
mount police power. (2) Plaintiff is entitled to be protected in the status
created by the agreement,--even if it was terminable at the will of either
party, for that does not make it at the will of others, and by the weight of
authority the unjustified interference of third parties is actionable although
the employment is at will.
(3) Plaintiff is entitled to the continued good will of its employees, and
the value of the relation is in the reasonable probability that by treating its
employees fairly it will be able to retain them, and to secure others as needed.
(4) The right of action for persuading an employee to leave his employer
is universally recognized, and rests upon fundamental principles of general
application, and not upon the English Statute of Laborers.
As to defendants' justification: (i) No question of the rights of em-
ployees is involved. Even if they have a right to strike, defendants have no
right to instigate a strike, since they are not the agents of the employees.
(2) While defendants and other workmen have a right to form unions,
and invite other workingmen to join, generally, the right is not absolute, but
must be exercised with a reasonable regard to the conflicting rights of others.
That a defendant wants the services is not a justification for enticing an
employee.
(3) Defendants' efforts were not bona fide to enlarge the membership of
the Union, but to organize the mine as a means to compel the owners to change
-their method of operation.
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(4) The means employed by defendants were unlawful, even though peace-
able, since it was a combination to procure concerted breaches of known
contracts, intentionally and maliciously designed to inflict unnecessary dam-
age on plaintiff by a strike, making it difficult if not impossible for plaintiff
to run its mine non-union, as it had a right to do.
(5) This is not a case of defendants withholding from an employer an
economic need,--a supply of labor,--until he assents to be governed by the
Union regulations, for defendants have no supply of labor, needed by plaintiff,
for the supply of non-union labor was ample in the district.
(6) Defendants are not justified by competition, for they are not com-
petitors of the plaintiff, and if they were, their method would be unfair, and
subject to injunction, just as it would be for a competing trader to induce
his rival's clerks to desert him at a critical time in order to cripple his
business.
The District Court held the United Mine Workers of America and its
branches, an unlawful organization under the laws of West Virginia and
under the Federal Anti-Trust Act; also that the injunction should apply to
three defendants not served with summons, and to the officers, not parties to
the suit, but who had succeeded in office some of the original defendants, and
also all present and future members of the Union without naming them.
These were held to be erroneous.
The most important parts of Mr. Justice BRAznas" dissenting opinion
relate to (i) Unionizing plaintiff's mine; (2) Attempt to induce employees to
violate their contracts; and (3) Persuading employees to leave plaintiff's
employment.
As to (i) a distinction, based upon the testimony is drawn between
"unionizing the mine," and "unionizing the employees ;" the latter is only
inducing the employees to join the Union; the former is inducing the em-
ployer to enter into a collective agreement with the Union (a) to employ only
members of the Union; (b) to negotiate only with its officers as to wages,
hours, etc.; (c) to treat only with the Union's representatives in settling
disputes arising from the employment.
Each of these is legal. To obtain them, any or all, men may strive or
strike; and if a Union may strike to obtain them, why not to secure an
agreement to provide for them? There is no coercion in the legal sense,
where a Union merely endeavors to induce employees to join a Union, with
the intention thereafter to order a strike, unless the employer consents to
unionize his shop. He is free to accept the agreement or disadvantage as he
chooses. If it is coercion to threaten to strike unless plaintiff consents to a
closed union-shop, it is also coercion to threaten not to give employment
unless the applicant will consent to a closed non-union shop. Either has the
equal right to withhold such an economic need from the other; in a legal
sense an agreement entered into, under such circumstances, is voluntarily
entered into.
As to (a), there is evidence of an attempt to induce plaintiff's employees
to agree to join the Union; but none whatever of any attempt to induce them
to violate their contract. Uhtil an employee actually joined the Union, he
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was not, under the contract, called upon to leave plaintiff's employ; there was
no breach of contract until he both joined and failed to withdraw. If it was
intended to secure agreements to join when a large number had consented
to do so, and then join together, and strike, unless plaintiff consented to
unionize his mine,-this would clearly be permissible under the contract.
As to (3), to induce third persons to leave an employment, or not to
enter it, if done maliciously and without justifiable cause is actionable al-
though such persons are free to exercise their own will. The contract here
added nothing to plaintiff's right in this connection, since it was terminable
at will. Persuasion, merely as a means is lawful, if, and only if, for a
justifiable cause; here this was to strengthen the Union, and the individual's
bargaining power by collective bargaining, so the workmen's condition would
be improved. It should not be doubted that to induce workmen to leave or
not to'enter employment to advance such purpose, is justifiable when they are
-not bound by contract to remain in such employment.
At the same time a decision was rendered in Eagle Glass & Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Thomas W. Rowe, et al., 38 Sup. Ct. 8o, involving the same situa-
tion, Mr. Justice PisNxy pronouncing the opinion of the majorify of the
Court, and the same justices dissenting as in the Hitchman case. In this
Glass case, the Circuit Court of Appeals, had said: "There is nothing in the
contract which requires such employees to work for any fixed or definite
-eriod. If any of them should decide to join [the Union] the plaintiff could
not recover damages for the breach of the same. * * * The only penalty is
that they cannot secure further employment from the plaintiff. * * * Such
being the case it would be unreasonable to hold the Union liable in damages
to the plaintiff because they had used lawful methods to induce the non-
union miners to become members of their organization. We fail to see how
-this contract can be taken as a basis for restraining the defendants from using
lawful methods for inducing the parties to the contract to join the organi-
zation."
Mr. Justice PiTMgY says: "This reasoning, essential to the decision reach-
ed, is erroneous for several reasons: (stated in the Hitchman case) (a) be-
cause plaintiff was entitled by law to be protected from interference with the
good will of its employees, although they were at liberty to quit the employ-
ment at pleasure; (b) because the case involved no question of the rights
of employers, and their right to quit gave to defendants no right to instigate
a strike; and (c) because the methods pursued by the defendants were not
lawful methods." These are substantially the same as (3) above, under
Plaintiff's rights, and (I) and (4) under Defendant's justification.
It is only in (4) above, that "procuring concerted breaches of known con-
tracts," is relied on as one of the elements of unlawfulness. Mr. Justice
B-AxnDxs, (2) above, says there is no evidence "whatever of any attempt to
-induce them to violate their contracts."
The majority opinion seems to consider that "agreeing to join" the Union,
and still continuing to work for the plaintiff, until the employee should
actually be taken into the Union, and becoming thereby subject to its juris-
.diction, was a substantial breach of the contract of employment, and if this
NOTE AND COMMENT
was induced by the defendant with knowledge, it was unlawful. Mr.
justice BRANnis on the other hand held that only by continuing to work for
the plaintiff after the employee had actually been taken into the Union would
be a breach of the contract. He seemed to admit that inducing the employer
to do that would be technically unlawful, but does not state very clearly that
such would be the case, or that it would be important if it were the case. In
short "procuring a breach of contract" does not seem to have had much to
do with either the majority or the minority opinion.
Suppose the first day H undertook to unionize plaintiff's mine, he had
induced all the employees to join the Union,-it would then have been their
duty, under the contract, to quit working for plaintiff at once,-and the
result would be as disastrous as if they had wrongfully struck,-but plaintiff
certainly could not then have successfully complained, for that reason. On
the other hand, if they had not quit, or if H had induced them not to quit
as the contract called for, could the plaintiff sue them or H, or the Union for
damage for breach of contract, or inducing breach thereof in not quitting?
I'erhaps, yes,-but certainly only for nominal damages; its remedy against
employees would be discharge, and if it discharged one, and the others then
quit, would it have an action against them? Certainly not.
The case would seem to stand then just as it would if there was no
breach of contract,-and then, as conceded in both opinions, inducing plaintiffs
to join the Union or 'going on a strike,' is actionable only if the means used
or the purpose is otherwise unlawful. The majority opinion seems to go the
whole length of holding that knowingly to persuade employees to join (or
agree to join) the Union, with the purpose of thereafter being able to order
them to strike, if the Union so determines, is an unlawful purpose and can
be enjoined,-because it disturbs or tends to disturb the status quo, or the
'reasonable probability' that it will remain the same. This certainly goes a
long way in curtailing the right and liberty of one person, or a group of per-
sons, to persuade one another to enter into co-operation for their supposed
mutual and otherwise lawful benefit.
Suppose that when G, L & W, asked plaintiff to unionize its mine, it had
agreed to do so; this would have been the same sort of a breach of the con-
tract by it, as the agreement to join the Union was by the employees in the
case. Would the employees then have had an injunction against the plaintiff
to prevent it from unionizing its mine, and discharging its employees, or
being able thereafter to do so, if they did not join the Union, contrary to the
agreement? We submit that to be consistent, the Court would have to hold
so. For do not the employees have a right to the same status quo, or to a
'reasonable probability' that their employer will not, at the instance of some
one else, unionize its mine, when it believes it would advance its interests to
do so? It is doubtful if the court would so hold. And if it did, would not
an employer complain that the court had seriously curtailed its constitutional
rights of liberty and property by compelling it to operate its mines 'non-union!
when it wanted to have them 'union.'
Are not the employees and the employers entitled to the 'equal protection,
of the laws by an equal application thereof? They should be.
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In recent years it seems to be conceded that the "right of association for
collective bargaining", should be recognized and protected by the laws in a
way similar to the protection extended to that 'exclusive right! included in the
ownership and control of property; in fact that in no other practical way can
those who have no property secure substantial economic equality with those
who have property. If this is true should not the man's property in himself
and the good will of his associates, be legally protected in the same way and
to the same extent as the ownership of tangible property is? H. L. W.
